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Abstract. We define the incentive process, a natural generalization of the Moran process
incorporating evolutionary updating mechanisms corresponding to well-known evolutionary
dynamics, such as the logit, projection, and best-reply dynamics. Fixation probabilities
and internal stable states are given for a variety of incentives, including new closed-forms,
as well as results relating fixation probabilities for members of two one-parameter families
of incentive processes. We show that the behaviors of the incentive process can deviate
significantly from the analogous properties of deterministic evolutionary dynamics in some
ways but are similar in others. For example, while the fixation probabilities change, their
ratio remains constant.
1. Introduction
In this manuscript we define an incentive-based generalization of the Moran process [18]
[19] [29] [21] called the incentive process, which captures Fermi selection, [30], and gives
analogous Markov processes for every possible incentive. In [7], Fryer introduces a functional
parameter called an incentive and defines the continuous incentive dynamics, simultaneously
describing many common dynamics in evolutionary game theory [15] [14], including the
replicator, best-reply, logit, and projection dynamics. An incentive can be thought of as
mediating the relationship between the population state and the fitness landscape. The
authors explored the stability theory of the these dynamics and various generalizations in
[12] [8] (see also [10]). In these studies, a simple relationship emerged for the replicator
equation and its incentive as a means of bringing incentives to finite population dynamics.
We investigate primarily two one-parameter families of incentives which we call the q-
replicator and q-Fermi incentives. These families include four of the more common incentives
in use: the projection, replicator, logit, and Fermi incentives. Recently human population
growth in Spain has been shown to follow patterns of exponential growth with scale-factors
q 6= 1 [13], and we consider the implications of such alternative values of q in finite population
dynamics. In essence, the incentive process uses incentive-proportionate selection rather than
simply fitness-proportionate selection as the Moran process (and replicator incentive) use as
a basis of capturing natural selection. As we will see, the fitness-proportionate selection
case has several special properties, but is by no means the only incentive suitable to model
evolutionary processes. For example, the ratio of fixation probabilities satisfies the same
relation as those of the Moran process, and so results regarding fitness flux for the Moran
and Wright-Fisher processes apply to the q-replicator family as well [26] [20].
The family of processes captured by incentives includes those studied by many authors,
e.g. the Fermi process [30]. We note that this family captures a similar set of processes
as Sandholm’s microfoundations approach using revisions protocols [22] [23] [24]. The be-
havior of the continuous incentive dynamics on the interior of the probability simplex are
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qualitatively similar to the replicator equation, at least locally [12]; for the incentive process
we find that the choice of incentive can exert a significant effect on the classical quantities
associated to the Moran process, such as the fixation probabilities.
2. Incentive Moran Process
The incentive process was briefly introduced in the appendix of [11], where it was shown
that the process has a particular bound on entropy rate. Let a population be composed
of two types A and B of size N with i individuals of type A and N − i individuals of
type B. The incentive process is a Markov process on the population states defined by
the following transition probabilities, corresponding to a birth-death process where birth is
incentive-proportionate and death is uniformly random:
Ti→i+1 =
ϕA(i)
ϕA(i) + ϕB(i)
N − i
N
Ti→i−1 =
ϕB(i)
ϕA(i) + ϕB(i)
i
N
,(1)
Ti→i = 1− Ti→i+1 − Ti→i−1,
The incentives ϕA(i) = ifA(i) and ϕB(i) = (N − i)fB(i) give the Moran process, where a
traditional choice for the fitness landscape is:
fA(i) =
a(i− 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1
fB(i) =
ci+ d(N − i− 1)
N − 1
for a game matrix defined by
A =
a b
c d
 .
Table 1 lists incentive functions for many common dynamics. Though we primarily inves-
tigate two one-parameter families of incentives defined in terms of a fitness landscape, we
note that the incentive need not depend on the fitness landscape or the population state.
The Fermi process of Traulsen et al is the q-Fermi for q = 1 [30], and for q = 0 is called
as the logit incentive. The q-replicator incentive has previously been studied in the con-
text of evolutionary game theory [10] [12] and derives from statistical-thermodynamic and
information-theoretic quantities [31]. Other than the best-reply incentive, which we will
consider primarily as a limiting case of the q-Fermi, we will assume that all incentives are
positive definite ϕ(k) > 0 if 0 < k < N to avoid the restatement of trivial hypotheses in
the results that follow. For the q-Fermi incentives, positivity is of course guaranteed for all
landscapes. This also implies that the fixation probability satisfies 0 < ρ < 1 for any such
incentive.
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Dynamics Incentive
Projection ϕT (i) = fT (i)
Replicator ϕT (i) = xTfT (i)
q-Replicator ϕT (i) = x
q
TfT (i)
Logit ϕT (i) =
exp(βfT (x))∑
j∈{A,B} exp(βfj(x))
Fermi ϕT (i) =
xT exp(βfT (x))∑
j∈{A,B} xjexp(βfj(x))
q-Fermi ϕT (i) =
xqT exp(βfT (x))∑
j∈{A,B} x
q
T exp(βfj(x))
Best Reply ϕT (i) = xTBRT (i)
Figure 1. Incentives for some common dynamics, where type T ∈ {A,B},
xA = i, xB = N − i, and BRT (i) is the best reply to state x = (i, N − i)
and is valued in {0, 1}. The projection incentive [25] is simply the q-replicator
with q = 0. Another way of looking at the projection incentive on the Moran
landscape is simply as a constant incentive, since the incentive itself is a con-
stant function in i. The logit incentive is the q-Fermi with q = 0. For more
examples see Table 1 in [7].
3. Fixation Probabilities
For the Moran process the probability of fixation ρi of type A when the population starts
in state (i, N − i) is:
(2) ρi =
s0,i−1
s0,N−1
where si,j =
j∑
k=i
tk and tj =
j∏
k=1
fB(k)
fA(k)
where we use the notation to that of [1] (see also [29]). We transform this for the incentive
process simply by substituting ϕA(i) = ifA and ϕB(i) = (N − i)fB(i), giving
tj =
j∏
k=1
kϕB(k)
(N − k)ϕA(k) =
(
j∏
k=1
ϕB(k)
ϕA(k)
)(
j∏
k=1
k
N − k
)
=
(
j∏
k=1
ϕB(k)
ϕA(k)
)(
N − 1
j
)−1
(3)
Note that this formula can also be derived directly in terms of the transition probabilities
(1). It is well-known that the fixation probabilities for the Moran process are
ρi =
1− r−i
1− r−N ,
3
when the fitness landscape is given by the game matrix a = b = r and c = d = 1, which we
refer to as the Moran landscape. We are mostly concerned with the fixation probability when
the starting state is i = 1 and will denote it simply by ρA or simply ρ when unambiguous;
similarly ρB will denote the probability of a single B-individual fixating, which is given by
ρB = 1− ρN−1 = tN−1/s0,N−1. We then have that
(4) ρB/ρA = tN−1 =
N−1∏
k=1
kϕB(k)
(N − k)ϕA(k)
where for the Moran process we simply have
ρB/ρA =
N−1∏
k=1
fB(k)
fA(k)
,
as in [29] and [21].
3.1. Explicit Closed-Forms for Fixation Probabilities. In [12] the authors consider
an incentive called the q-replicator incentive. The projection incentive (corresponding to
the projection dynamic [25]) is the special case where q = 0 and the replicator incentive
when q = 1. Although Equation 3 determines the fixation probabilities for this incentive,
a pleasing closed form does not readily emerge for arbitrary q. Nevertheless the fixation
probabilities can sometimes be expressed in terms of hypergeometric coefficients (though in
some cases no closed-form can be given [2]). For q = 2, the closed form is
ρq=2(r) =
(
1 +
1
r
)1−N
An interesting special case is that of the neutral landscape with r = 1, though closed-form
expressions are still hard to come by other than for q = 1, 2, 3. The q-replicator incentive
shares some of the intuitive properties of the classical case q = 1. For instance, the fixation
probabilities of each of the two types are equal for the neutral landscape for all q, which can
easily be deduced from Equation 4. Many properties, however, are dependent on the value
of the parameter. For q = 0, a straightforward calculation shows that
ρq=0(N) =
1∑N−1
k=1
(
N−1
k
)−1 = 2NN 1∑N
k=1
2k
k
,
where the last equality uses an identity from [28]. From this formula we can deduce that
1/N < ρq=0(N) < 1/2 for N > 2. Perhaps surprisingly, limN→∞ ρ1(N) → 0 only holds for
q ≥ 1; for q = 0, the limit is 1/2. The 2-replicator incentive has fixation probability ρq=2 =
21−N and the 3-replicator incentive has fixation probability ρq=3 =
(
2N−2
N−1
)−1
. Compare to
ρq=1 = 1/N for the 1-replicator incentive. We have that ρq=3(N) < 2
1−N = ρq=2(N) <
1/N = ρq=1(N) < ρq=0(N) for N > 2 (they are all equal to 1/2 when N = 2). See Figure 2.
Any closed form for the q-replicator gives a closed form for the q-Fermi for the same q
with the substitution r 7→ eβ(r−1), so the discussion above also gives a closed-form for the
2-Fermi. Note also that the fixation probability for the best-reply dynamic is a step function
jumping from zero to one at r = 1, and is obtainable as a limit of the q-Fermi as β →∞.
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Figure 2. Left: Fixation probabilities for the neutral fitness landscape for
the q-replicator incentive as a function of population size. Top to bottom:
q = 0, 0.5, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 2. Right: Heatmap of fixation probabilities for the neutral
fitness landscape for the q-replicator incentive as a function of population size.
The parameter q is on the vertical axis; population size N on the horizontal.
3.2. Monotonicity of Fixation Probabilities. We have seen a particular case of the
departure of behavior between deterministically defined incentive dynamics and the incentive
process. The continuous incentive dynamic behaves qualitatively similarly to the replicator
dynamic with respect to fixation for the Moran landscape. That is, if r > 1, fixation is
guaranteed for any incentive listed in Table 1 when the fitness landscape is given by the
Moran landscape with matrix Ar. For the incentive process, the fixation probabilities are
dependent on the incentive and its parameters, so the long-run behaviors are qualitatively
different. More precisely, we have the following.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ be an incentive, let N > 2, and define a new incentive ψA,q(i) = i
qϕA(i)
and ψB,q(i) = (N − i)qϕB(i). Then for p < q, ρA,p > ρA,q.
Proof. First note that
j∏
k=1
N − k
k
=
(
N − 1
j
)
> 1
if j < N − 1 and N > 2. Then
j∏
k=1
(N − k)p−1ϕB(k)
kp−1ϕA(k)
=
j∏
k=1
ϕB(k)
ϕA(k)
(
j∏
k=1
N − k
k
)p−1
<
j∏
k=1
ϕB(k)
ϕA(k)
(
j∏
k=1
N − k
k
)q−1
=
j∏
k=1
(N − k)q−1ϕB(k)
kq−1ϕA(k)
The inequality is then reversed in the equation for the fixation probability (3). 
There are immediate consequences of Theorem 1. In particular, the fixation probability
of type A for the projection process is greater than that of the replicator incentive, which is
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Figure 3. Fixation Probabilities for the Moran landscape for the Logit in-
centive versus relative fitness r, population size N = 10. From the intersection
point outward: β = 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 10. The fixations approach that of the best-
reply incentive as β →∞ (a step function).
greater than that of the 2-replicator incentive, and so on (including the special case discussed
before the theorem). For the Moran landscape, since there are known closed-forms for q = 1
and q = 2, there are explicit upper and/or lower bounds for various q < 1, 1 < q < 2, and
q > 2. The same holds for the q-Fermi incentive.
A somewhat similar result holds for variation in β for the q-Fermi. Clearly Theorem 1
applies to the q-Fermi process for fixed β. For variable β, fixed q, and the Moran landscape,
the analogous theorem for variation in β depends on the value of r. Since the effective
relative fitness is eβ(r−1), the fixation probability increases or decreases in β depending on
whether r − 1 > 0 or r − 1 < 0. See Figure 3.
3.3. Ratios of Fixation Probabilities. Our next theorem shows that some properties of
the fixation probabilities are independent of q.
Theorem 2. Let ϕ be an incentive and define a new incentive ψA,q(i) = i
qϕA(i) and ψB,q(i) =
(N − i)qϕB(i). Then the ratio of fixation probabilities ρB/ρA is independent of q.
Proof. From equations 3 and 4,(
N−1∏
k=1
ϕB(k)
ϕA(k)
)(
N − 1
N − 1
)−1
= tN−1 =
(
N−1∏
k=1
ϕB(k)
ϕA(k)
)(
N − 1
N − 1
)q−1
So the ratio of fixation probabilities is the same for ψ and ϕ. 
For the q-replicator and q-Fermi incentives, the ratio of fixation probabilities is constant
in q, even though the fixation probabilities themselves are not the same (as we have already
seen for the neutral landscape, and as implied by Theorem 1). Moreover the ratio of fixation
probabilities for these two families of incentives are the same as for the Moran process!
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Together the two theorems of this section show that even though the fixation probabilities
vary with q, their ratio does not; Theorem 2 extends Theorem 1 to include ρB (though a
direct calculation could have done the same). Theorem 2 allows us to use eariler calculations
for ρA to easily calculate ρB, e.g., for 2-replicator, that ρB = (1 + r)
1−N , since ρB/ρA = r1−N
for the Moran process [21]. (There is a r 7→ 1/r symmetry in fixation probabilities, as for the
Moran process.) For the q-Fermi and the Moran landscape, the ratio of fixation probabilities
is
(5) log
ρA
ρB
= −
N−1∑
k=1
β (fB(k)− fA(k)) = β(r − 1)(N − 1),
giving a family-wide relation between the population size, the strength of selection, and the
relative fitness. From this we can see that for large β, fixation favors the better reply (with
sign dictated by r − 1), as expected. If r > 1, larger populations favor fixation of type A,
since the probability that A is randomly chosen for replacement for small populations is
diminished; the strength of selection parameter β affects the relative fixation probabilities
in the same manner, amplifying the difference in relative fitness, and possibly tempering the
effects of the population size (small or large) depending on the values of N and β (Equation
5).
We also have from Theorem 2 that for large population sizes the fixation probabilities of
the two types converge to zero and one, for all q for the q-replicator, for r 6= 1. This is simply
because ρB
ρA
= r1−N (see [21] for q = 1), and since this ratio is constant for all q. For a large
population, either ρB
ρA
or its reciprocal approaches 0, depending on if r > 1 or r < 1. This
is not true for the neutral landscape r = 1, where the two fixation probabilities are equal
for all N . Hence despite the affect the parameter q can have on fixation probabilities, some
properties of the Moran process are unchanged. Note though that for the q-Fermi incentive
this is also true – one of the two fixation probabilities goes to zero as either N or β gets
large, or they are equal if r = 1.
Theorem 2 also implies that the boundary elements of the stationary probabilities of the q-
replicator incentive process are independent of q, as mutation rates go to zero. This is because
the stationary probability pi(0) of state (0, N) is ρA/(ρA + ρB) = 1/(1 + ρB/ρA), which is
independent of q by the theorem. Indeed in this case the stationary distributions are identical,
but direct calculations show that for nonzero mutation rates the stationary distributions are
not equal. There are further implications for the entropy rate of the processes and other
quantities related to the stationary distribution, but is beyond the scope of this investigation.
(See [9] and [11].)
3.4. Fitness Flux and Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem. There is another important
consequence of Theorem 2. In [20], Mustonen and La¨ssig introduce the fitness flux theorem as
an application of Crook’s fluctuation theorem [5], and show that there is a version of Fisher’s
Fundamental theorem of Natural Selection [6] for the Moran process and the Wright-Fisher
process [17]. In our context, this amounts to essentially “compressing” the processes to a new
process with just two states – All Type A and All Type B – while introducing a mutation
from the fixated states to the states where the population has single A or B mutant (i.e. in
the manner of [4]). More precisely, we set T0→1 = µ = TN→N−1, and set T1→N = ρA and
TN−1→0 = ρB. Then we further reduce to a two state process where TAll A→All B = µρA and
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TAll B→All A = µρB. Then the analogous ratio to Equation 4 is simply ρB/ρA, and is equal to
r1−N for the Moran process.
Since Theorem 2 shows that the ratio of fixation probabilities for the q-replicator incentive
process are the same as those of the Moran process, the above discussion and derivations
in [20] also apply to the incentive process. So these incentives carry a natural version of
Fisher’s fundamental theorem, further justifying their use as models of selective processes.
For a readable summary of the associated quantities and the relationship to the second law
of thermodynamics, see [27].
We note that this is remarkably similar to the state of affairs for deterministic dynamics in
which the relative entropy yields a Lyapunov function and there is also an associated version
of Fisher’s Fundamental theorem [12] [10].
4. Incentive Stable States
The incentive dynamic was defined in part to investigate the stability of incentive dy-
namics. In this section we leave the discussion of fixation probabilities and consider the
appropriate notions of evolutionary equilibria. The natural generalization of an evolutionar-
ily stable state to a process driven by an incentive is an incentive stable state (ISS) [7]. For
the continuous incentive dynamic on the simplex, the ISS condition is simply
∑
i
xˆi − xi
xi
ϕi(x) > 0,
which gives the familiar evolutionarily stable state condition (ESS) xˆ ·f(x) > x ·f(x) for the
replicator incentive ϕi(x) = xifi(x). Fryer showed that the ISS condition for the best reply
dynamic is again ESS, and in [12], for 2x2 linear games, it was shown that an ISS for the
projection dynamic is again an ESS, that is satisfies the equation x1 = (d−b)/(a−c+d−b),
which is expected from the known Lyapunov theorems [12] [25]. This is not always the case,
however – an ISS can fail to be an ESS.
An analog of ESS exists for the Moran process [21] by setting equal the transition proba-
bilities and solving for the state i, which yields
(6)
i
N
=
d− b+ a−d
N
a− c+ d− b
Note that this definition lacks a stability criterion, and often additional criteria are imposed,
such as ESSN [21]. For the incentive process, we can find the ISS analogously by solving
(N − i)ϕA(i) = iϕB(i), which we call ISS candidates to indicate that these states have not
yet been identified as stable. It is easy to see that this relation can lead to more interesting
interior dynamics, since there can be multiple interior ISS candidates while there can be at
most one ESS for the Moran process with linear fitness determined by a game matrix. Let
us consider the q-replicator incentive for q = 0, 1, 2. The case q = 1 is Equation 6 above. For
q = 0 and q = 2, the ISS candidate condition gives curiously similar quadratic equations in
8
Figure 4. ISS candidates i/N for q-replicator incentive. Blue dots: q = 1,
red +: q = 0, green diamonds: q = 2. Notice that for q = 0, depending on N ,
there may be no ISS or two ISS candidates in contrast to the Moran process
(q = 1) for which there is a single interior ISS. The game matrix for all three
incentives is given by a = 20, b = 1, c = 7, d = 10.
i/N :
(a+ c− b− d)
(
i
N
)2
+
(
d+ 2b− a− a+ d
N
)
i
N
+
( a
N
− b
)
= 0
(a+ c− b− d)
(
i
N
)2
+
(
b+ 2d− c− a+ d
N
)
i
N
+
(
d
N
− d
)
= 0,
which of course in general need not have the same solutions for particular a, b, c, and d. See
Figure 4. It is easy to see that if N is even and fA(N/2) = fB(N/2) then this ISS candidate
equation is satisfied for all q at i = N/2. For instance, a Hawk-Dove game matrix a = 1 = d,
b = 2 = c, which has an internal ESS for the replicator dynamic at (N/2, N/2), is an ISS
candidate for any q.
For the Moran process and landscape, there is no interior ISS candidate (no ESS) for the
replicator incentive if r 6= 1; there is such an interior point for the q-replicator for all other
values of q, including the projection incentive. This point is given by:
(7)
i
N
=
1
1 + r
1
q−1
< 1.
Similarly for the q-Fermi. See Figure 5. For continuous dynamics, these points are stable
for q < 1; for q > 1, the stability depends on the starting state of the dynamic [12].
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Figure 5. Left: ISS candidates i/N for q-replicator incentive (Equation 7).
Right: Same for q-Fermi incentive with β = 1. Notice that the lines of con-
stancy are straightened by the exponential.
5. Discussion
We have seen that the choice of incentive can have a striking effect on the incentive
process, even for ostensibly very similar incentives. The choice of incentive can dramatically
alter the large population behavior of the process, notably for the fixation probabilities of
the neutral fitness landscape. Fixation probabilities shift with changes in the parameter q
for the q-replicator and q-Fermi, nevertheless the ratio of the fixation probabilities of the
two population types remains constant as q varies, which has several consequences for the
behavior of the process. Moreover, we see that the choice of incentive can internally shift
the “equilibrium” of the process away from the boundary.
In some sense, we see ways in which fitness-proportionate selection as in the Moran process
is special. In particular, it is the only incentive in the q-replicator family with neutral
fixation probability ρ = 1/N . The particular value q = 1 is a qualitative behavior changing
point for the internal equilibrium (see Figure 5), and is known to have unique properties
related to dynamics on the probability simplex [10] [3]. This is in contrast to the analogous
deterministic dynamics, where the behaviors of the various incentives are often much more
similar, such as the fact that the internal equilibria of the projection and replicator dynamics
are the same.
Methods. All computations were performed with python code available at https://github.
com/marcharper/fixation. All plots created with matplotlib [16].
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